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New regulations typically encourage thinking
about ways to evade or profit from changed circumstances, despite "an ongoing quest for an
equilibrium among all parties: regulators, legislators, operators and consumers."' Depending on
one's perspective, clever and unanticipated outcomes help blunt the adverse and meddlesome
impact of regulations, or prevent regulation from
fully achieving essential public policy objectives.
Perhaps because of the pace of technological and
marketplace change, legislators and regulators
have unwittingly created an inordinate number of
opportunities for stakeholders to exploit inconsistencies in the nature and scope of telecommunications regulation. 2 Asymmetries in regulatory
burdens create incentives to find ways to exploit
artificial competitive advantages and avoid regulatory classifications that create a bias toward more
pervasive and costly regulatory burdens. 3 Asym* Professor, Penn State University, 105-C Carnegie Building, UniversityPark, Pennsylvania, 16802 (814) 863-7996;
rmf5@psu.edu.
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See Michela Cimatoribus et al., Impacts of the 1996 Tele-

communications Act on the U.S. Model of Telecommunications Policy, 22 TELECOMM. POL'v 493, 509 (1998).
2 With rather high frequency, appellate courts have rejected the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC" or
"Commission") interpretation of a legislative mandate or a
Commission unilateral rulemaking initiative. For example,
on several occasions the FCC unsuccessfully attempted to
mandate the elimination of a statutorily imposed tariff filing
reqtuirement:
Commission efforts to move to a no tariff environment
for interexchange carriers-insofar as those carriers do
not exercise market power-have not had an easy time
with this court and the Supreme Court. For over six decades a tariff regime was mandated by the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the FCC to review telecommunications

carriers' tariffs to ensure their

reasonableness. The Act requires carriers to file their tariffs with the FCC, and they are prohibited from charging
consumers except as provided in the tariffs. Starting in
the early 1980s, the Commission tried to prohibit tarifffiling by nondominant carriers-in essence, those other
than AT&T-but that effort was successfully challenged
in this court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,

metrical regulation has the potential to tilt the
competitive playing field in favor of one class of

4
telecommunications carriers or service providers.

Over the years, incumbents and newcomers
alike have gamed the regulatory process to secure
a competitive advantage in terms of reduced regulation or cost savings. With skillful maneuvering, a
largely unregulated venture can provide services
functionally equivalent to those offered by a substantially regulated carrier. Other strategies involve securing a classification that exempts the operator from more burdensome regulatory duties
or qualifies the operator to receive cost savings or
cost avoidance opportunities.
Currently, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
can qualify for "reciprocal" interconnection payments from local exchange carriers without having to generate a return flow of traffic. 5 ISPs also
can offer Internet-mediated long distance tele765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), where we struck down
"mandatory detariffing" as inconsistent with the 1934
Act.
MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 761-62 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (citations omitted).
3 Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive
Telecommunications, 8 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 3, 6 (1996) ("[A]II

forms of asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias toward some firms or technologies.").
4 See Prof. Dr. Gunter Knieps, Interconnection and Network
Access, 23 FORDHLAM INT'L LJ. 90, 99 (2000).
There is a wide range of possible asymmetric regulation.
Whereas, in the past, legal entry barriers protected monopolistic carriers, the regulatory pendulum now seems
to swing in the opposite direction. Asymmetric regulation in favor of newcomers is motivated by the conviction that, even after the abolishment of the legal monopoly, the incumbent carrier would still possess a factual
monopoly position on the network infrastructure and
the normal voice telephone service. Therefore, initial
support of newcomers, at least for a sufficient transition
period, has been recommended recently in the national
regulatory debates.
Id.
5
See Rebecca Beynon, The FCC's Implementation of the 1996
Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.

27, 39 (2000).
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phone services free of interconnection charges
without the duty to make universal service contributions like that of competitors.6 Longer-standing
tactics include selecting a favorable jurisdiction
(federal rather than state), legal classification
(private carrier versus common carrier) 7 and cash
flow status (reseller instead of facilities-based carrier).
I. THE LAW OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
The authors of the Telecommunications Act of
Each time a customer places a call to the ISP, the incumbent carrier winds up paying the competing carrier a
per-minute termination fee. Consider also the nature of
ISP traffic. First, such traffic is typically 'one way.' That
is, many customers call an ISP in order to connect to the
Internet, but an ISP seldom places calls to other customers. Second, calls made to ISPs are typically much longer
than the average voice call, since people often surf the
Internet for hours at a time. The potential for regulatory
arbitrage is obvious-a competing carrier that signs up
an ISP as a customer stands to collect far more in reciprocal compensation fees than it will pay out in connection with serving that customer.
Id.
6 See In re Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,541-46, paras.
83-93 (1998) [hereinafter Report to Congress]; see also Robert
M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARVARDJ.L. & Trnch. 395 (2000)
[hereinafter Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge]; Jamie N.
Nafziger, Time To Pay Up: Internet Service Providers' Universal
Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37 (1997); Dennis W.
Moore, Jr., Regulation of the Internet and Internet Telephony
Through the Imposition of Access Charges, 76 TEX. L. REV. 183
(1997); Hank lntven et al., Internet Telephony-the Regulatory
Issues, 21 HASTINC;S COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Seth A. Cohen, Deregulating,Defiagmenting & Interconnecting: Reconsidering Commercial Telecommunications Regulation in Relation to the
Rise of Internet Telephony, 18J.L. & COM. 133 (1998); Henry E.
Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC.JurisdictionOver Internet Telephony, 5 CoMMLAw CoNsPEcrus 43 (1997); Katherine Collins,
International Accounting Rate Reform: The Role of International
Organizations and Implicationsfor Developing Countries, 31 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1077 (2000).
7 SeeJames H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriersand the
Decision Whether to Be a Common Carrieror a Non-Regulated Communications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 91 (2000).
8 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-170).
9 Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change
and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress
and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REVv. 976, 983 (1997) [hereinafter
Price & Duffy]. In the floor discussions of the new legislation,
it was commonplace to hear that a vision of "the convergence
of these technologies" lay at "the heart of this reform effort,"
[citing 142 CONG. Rv(:. H1161 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Oxley)] that it was "about time for Congress to
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19968 (the "'96 Act") had great expectations9 that
they could engineer competition and enhance
consumer welfare simply by rewriting a law to remove regulatory barriers to competition.10 Congress assumed that it could craft legislation that
created complementary incentives to achieve this
goal. I For incumbent Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs"), the law links their access to long distance markets with affirmative steps to open their
networks to new local exchange service competitors.1 2 The law also seeks to motivate competitive
local exchange carriers ("CLECs") to construct facilities, which will stimulate demand through
update the law to catch up with the new convergence in
video, computer and telephone technologies," [citing 141
CONG. REC. S8464 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Leahy)] and that the bill would "allow the cable, telephone, computer, broadcasting, and other telecommunications industries more easily to converge and transform themselves." [citing 141 CONG. REc. S8477 (daily ed. June 15,
1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)]. Digitalization, among
other things, had rendered modes of transmitting information interchangeable; as a result, many in Congress believed
that historic divisions, artificially supported by legislative distinctions and federal and state bureaucratic arrangements,
needed to be dissolved. Id. See also Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-458, at H1078 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
11)Michael 1.Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49 FED.

COMM. L.J. 251

(1997). For background on the Telecommunications Act of
1996, see generally Robert M. Frieden, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Predicting the Winners and Losers, 20 I-HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 11 (1997); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REv. 123, 127
(1996); Michael Glover & Donna Epps, Is The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Working?, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1013 (2000);
John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case Study of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L.
REV.

143 (2000) [hereinafter Roberts]; Aimee M. Adler, Com-

petition in Telephony: Perception or Reality? Current Barriers to The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7J.L. & POL'Y 571 (1999).

11 See Price & Duffy, supra note 9, at 982 ("There was a
headiness to the rhetoric, a sense that a legislative revolution
would assist, and perhaps even underwrite, a technological
and organizational revolution in which past media categories
would be swept away and a new era of national achievement
and citizen and consumer empowerment would be
achieved.").
12
47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. IV 1998). This section contains
a fourteen-point checklist, among other requirements, which
BOCs must adhere to before being allowed into the interLATA long distance telephone service markets. LATA is an
acronym for Local Access and Transport Area, a geographical region created in the AT&T divestiture case within which

the spun-off BOCs can provide local and toll services. 47
U.S.C. § 153(25) (A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1998). The 14-point competitive checklist requires the BOCs to provide: 1) full and
fair interconnection with competitive local exchange carriers
in accordance with the requirements of §§ 251(c)(2) and

252(d)(1); 2) nondiscriminatory and "ala carte" access to
network elements in accordance with the requirements of
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lower prices and new options, rather than by
reselling the services of incumbent local exchange
carriers ("ILECs").13

Congress underestimated the ability of stake4
holders to thwart progress through litigation'
and to exploit ambiguous language in the '96 Act
to maintain or create an unlevel competitive playing field.'5 Stakeholders have spent more time vying in the courts than competing in the marketplace.16 Likewise, stakeholders have devised
clever ways to exploit '96 Act provisions in ways
not contemplated by Congress, such as routing Internet traffic through a CLEC, which is affiliated
with an ISP, to trigger '96 Act mandated compensation, even though the CLEC has little or no off7
setting traffic for ILEC routing.'
Technological innovations and market convergence in telecommunications require commensu§§ 251 (c) (3) and 252 (d) (1); 3) nondiscriminatory access to
the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned or controlled by the Bell operating company at just and reasonable
rates in accordance with the requirements of § 224; 4) local
loop transmission from the central office to a customer's
premises, unbundled from local switching or other services;
5) local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier's switch unbundled from switching or other
services; 6) local switching unbundled from transport, local
loop transmission, or other services; 7) nondiscriminatory access to 911 emergency services, directory assistance services
to allow the other carriers' customers to obtain telephone
numbers and operator call completion services; 8) white
pages directory listings for customers of other carriers' telephone exchange services; 9) nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to the other carriers' telephone exchange service customers; nondiscriminatory access
to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and completion; 10) nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and
completion; 11) number portability, which is, the ability of a
former BOC customer to retain use of a preexisting telephone number after having subscribed to telephone service
from another carrier; 12) nondiscriminatory access to such
services or information as are necessary to allow requesting
carriers to implement local dialing parity in accordance with
the requirements of § 251 (b) (3), which is the same number
of digits dialed for either BOC or alternative service; 13) reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the
requirements of § 252(d) (2), which is compensation from a
BOC to a CLEC when it completes a call and vice versa; and
14) telecommunications services are available for resale in accordance with the requirements of §§ 251(c)(4) and
252(d) (3). 47 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (2) (B).
13 Alexandra M. Wilson, HarmonizingRegulation by Promoting Facilities-BasedCompetition, 8 GEO. MASON L. Rxv. 729, 730

(2000) ("Because the 1996 Act alone will not solve the regulatory convergence problem, the dilemma policymakers face
is how to change the current system to alleviate the detrimental effects of asymmetrical regulation, and how to avoid the
reflexive application of shopworn regulatory antecedents.").
14

Rebecca Beynon, The FCCs Implementation of the 1996

rate adjustments in the legal and regulatory
arena, particularly when ventures now can provide functionally equivalent services yet face different regulatory treatment. Legislative changes
to the status quo occur most infrequently,' 8 while
"regulatory lag"' 9 becomes a more common occurrence, as a significant period of time may run
before regulations reflect changed technological
and marketplace circumstances.20 During such
periods of delayed adjustment the regulatory process may favor one competitor over others, particularly when marketplace conditions trigger new
competitive opportunities and technological convergence eliminates barriers to market entry or
market segmentation. 2' Comparatively lighter regulation of market entrants may properly incubate
and promote incipient competition. But without
recalibration, a regulatory dichotomy may distort
Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.

27, 27-29 (2000).
15 See Kathleen Wallman, A Birthday Party: The Terrible or
Terrific Two's? 1996 Federal Telecommunications Act, 51 FED.

COMM. L.J. 229, 229-31 (1998).
16 Jube Shiver, Jr., Los Angles Times Interview; William Kennard: On Regulating the Marketplace of the Telecommunications
Boom, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1998, at M3.("['T]oo many of the

stakeholders in this debate would rather litigate than compete.'").
17
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
18 Roberts, supra note 10, at 146 ("Congress repeatedly
ignored or rebuffed calls by the FCC and critics to amend
and update the 1934 Act to provide guidance on emerging
issues and technologies.").
19 Regulatory lag has been defined as "the general delay
in the responses of regulators to changes in cost or market
conditions." Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition and Regulatory Policiesfor Interactive Broadband Networks, 68
S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1221 (1995).
20 James Alleman et al., UniversalService: The Poverty of Pol-

icy, 71 U. COLO. L. Rv. 849, 850 (2000) ("For the transition
to competition to succeed, asymmetric measures to control
market power should be phased out as the incumbent's market power diminishes.").
21
For example, when separate companies installed separate wires to provide mutually exclusive telephone and video
services, different legal and regulatory classifications applied
to telephone and cable television services, with the former
treated as common carriage and the latter as non-common
carriage.
[C] able systems have two relevant special characteristics.
They are unusually involved with government, for they
depend upon government permission and government
facilities (streets, rights-of-way) to string the cable necessary for their services. And in respect to leased channels,
their speech interests are relatively weak because they
act less like editors, such as newspapers or television
broadcasters, than like common carriers, such as telephone companies.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 739 (1996).
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markets and handicap incumbents who deserve
similar deregulation or streamlined government
"
oversight. 2
The authors of the '96 Act thought they had
performed such a rebalancing of the telecommunications regulatory regime so that more robust
competition might ensue without unduly favoring
entrants with preferential treatment or allowing
incumbents to exploit market power and engage
in anticompetitive practices. To the apparent dismay of Congress, telecommunication and information service providers have proven to be quite
adept at exploiting opportunities to capture
greater profits and market share by tilting the
competitive playing field to their advantage.
While designed to achieve market access parity,
the '96 Act, like so many laws and regulations
before it, has become a vehicle for clever interpre23
tation, exploitation and litigation.
For example, Congress thought that it could
ensure market access parity through a "one-sizefits-all" regulatory classification, such as common
22
Some critics of FCC policies requiring ILECs to share
local distribution facilities allege:
[such] unbundling would be a classic case of asymmetric
regulation: the CLEC would pursue the more profitable,
unregulated service, while the ILEC would be left providing basic local service (in many cases, below cost). Innovation would be eroded by regulations that arbitrarily
favored CLECs, without regard to the adverse effect of
such asymmetric regulation on the welfare of consumers.

Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REC.. 1, 32-33 (2000).
23
See Stanley M. Gorinson, Deregulation in Telecommunications: Competition or Confusion? 47 FED. LAw. 24, 26-27 (2000).
24
47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (Supp. IV 1998) (deeming every
telecommunications carrier a "common carrier under this
Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services").
25
The FCC may forbear from applying any regulation or
any provision of the Communications Act if (1) "enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regula-

tions . . . are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or

unreasonably discriminatory," (2) enforcement is not necessary to protect consumers and (3) forbearance is consistent
with the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. V
1999).
26 In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1195-96
(D.C. Cir. 1985), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia struck down "mandatory detariffing" as inconsistent with the Communications Act of 1934; see also AT&T Co.
v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1992), affd sub nom.
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994)
(noting the FCC could not suspend (permissively or
mandatorily) the tariff filing obligations for interexchange
carriers, whether they had market power or not); MCI
WorldCom, Inc. v.FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 766 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
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carriage status for all types of commercial service
providers. 24 However, Congress also authorized
the FCC to eliminate aspects of traditional common carrier responsibilities, if the public interest
supported it.25 The new legislative mandate to
undo common carrier responsibilities, like filing
and complying with tariffs, 26 combine with previous FCC efforts selectively to streamline regulations if not deregulate entirely. 27 Collectively,
these apparently pro-competitive initiatives expanded the dichotomy between the nature and
scope of regulation applied to dominant, incumbent carriers vfs-a-vfs market entrants and other
carriers that may qualify for streamlined regulation. These initiatives blur the distinction between
traditionally regulated common carriers and their
28
unregulated private carrier counterparts.
Some telecommunications ventures have
avoided costly regulatory burdens simply on
grounds that they lack market power, 29 or because they have semantically crafted services so
that they qualify for little or no regulatory over(holding that mandatory detariffing for interexchange carriers was reasonable).
27
In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorization
Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77
F.C.C.2d 308, 309-10, paras. 2, 8, 10 (1979); In re Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services, First Report and Order,
85 F.C.C.2d 1, 2, 4, paras. 2, 4, 6 (1980), Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981), Second Report
and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982), reconsideration denied, 93
F.C.C.2d 54 (1983), Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (Apr. 22, 1982), Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (Oct. 14, 1983), Fourth Report and
Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), Fourth FurtherNotice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,856 (Mar. 28, 1984), Fifth Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984), Sixth Report and Order, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), rev'd and remanded sub nom. MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re
Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace,
Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, 5881, para. 2 (1991), on
reconsideration,7 FCC Rcd. 2677 (1992), on further reconsideration, 8 FCC Rcd. 2659 (1993), Second Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 3668 (1993), on further reconsideration,10 FCC Rcd. 4562
(1995) (reducing scope of AT&T's dominant carrier status
and allowing provision of service based on customized tariffs
preceded by a contract for carriage), further reconsiderationdenied, 10 FCC Rcd. 4421 (1995).
28
See Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 955, 956, 967 (1997).
29
The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics defines
market power as the "ability of a single, or group of buyer(s)
or seller(s) to influence the price of the product or service in
which it is trading. A perfectly competitive market in equilibrium ensures the complete absence of market power." THE
MIT DICIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMIcs 268 (David W.
Pearce ed., MIT Press 1995).
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sight. On the other hand, some incumbents have
continued to incur such burdens despite changed
circumstances and the '96 Act requirement that
all service providers, regardless of regulatory classification, should bear on a "competitively neutral" basis the obligation of making financial contributions to support universal access to basic
telecommunications. 30 For example, ISPs and
other ventures providing enhancements to leased
lines do not pay local exchange carrier access
charges or contribute to universal service funding
even when other carriers would trigger such pay1
ments.3
Both newcomers and subsidiaries of incum-

tory opportunism defeat the possibility of establishing a dual track regulatory regime. Additionally, the article scrutinizes marketplace anomalies
created by international accounting rate arbitrage
and Internet telephony. The availability of these
services results, in part, from a regulatory dichotomy that triggers a diversion or inflow of funds
based on an operator's regulatory classification
and its adeptness at exploiting arbitrage opportunities. The article concludes with suggestions on
how legislators and regulators might curb regulatory opportunism by abandoning the strategy of
classifying carriers based on static technological
or market share assumptions.

bents may secure regulatory exemptions on semantic grounds by characterizing and offering
services in a way that qualifies for diminished regulation. Incumbents may exploit regulatory inertia that maintains regulatory safeguards and barriers to market entry based on persisting concepts
of "natural monopoly" and a strained view that

only one enterprise can achieve public policy
objectives such as effectively executing a universal

service mission. Alternatively, incumbent carriers
may create separate subsidiaries to qualify for unregulated or lightly regulated non-dominant, mar32
ket entrant status.
Regulatory arbitrage refers to the ability of
stakeholders to exploit differences in legislative
and regulatory classifications with an eye toward
securing more favorable or less burdensome regulatory treatment that typically will accrue financial
and competitive advantages."' This article will examine a number of semantically driven regulatory
dichotomies (common carrier versus private carrier, basic versus enhanced services and ILEC versus CLEC) with an eye toward determining
whether technological convergence and regula47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (Stipp. IV 1998) ("Every telecom30
munications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and
advance universal service."); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2) (A) (requiring the FCC to "establish competitively neutral rules(A) to enhance, to the extent technically feasible and economically reasonable, access to advanced telecommunications and information services for all public and nonprofit
elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries"); Texas Office of Public Utility
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed
sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
31

Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge, supra note 6, at

412-13.

II.

REGULATORY ARBITRAGE

Regulation invites clever and strategic thinking
about ways to exploit loopholes to secure a competitive or financial windfall. Evading a regulatory
burden can translate into cost savings and greater
nimbleness in a competitive environment. Sometimes avoiding a regulatory requirement means
that the stakeholder can save money or even qualify for an unexpected flow of revenues. The arbitrage aspect of this brinkmanship involves the
strategic targeting and qualifying to receive lax or
favorable regulatory treatment while, at the same
time, retaining the ability to offer functionally
equivalent services that compete with offerings of
other stakeholders subject to more burdensome,
costly and unfavorable regulatory treatment.
The FCC does not wish to tilt the competitive
playing field in favor of one class of player vis-a-vfs
others, yet many of its regulatory decisions have
that result. Often the Commission may purport
not to favor any class of operator, but the nature
of the burdens placed on incumbents or the re32
As part of its initial deregulatory thrust in the 1980s,
the FCC developed a regulatory dichotomy between dominant carriers to be subject to conventional but possibly
streamlined regulation, and nondominant carriers to be subject to regulatory forbearance based on the view that carriers
lacking market power should not be burdened with regulations designed to curb the potential for dominant carriers to
engage in anticompetitive practices. See Scott M. Schoenwald,

Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications
Market: The Dominant/Nondominant CarrierApproach and the
Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367, 375-76

(1997).
33 A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS
AND THiF GLOBAL

IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATrION POLICY

INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTrURE

Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).

129 (Brian
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fusal to unburden them relative to market entrants invariably favors the latter group.
Over the years a number of such regulatory
anomalies and asymmetries have occurred. For
example, the price, but not necessarily the cost, of
a minute of telecommunication use has depended
on such factors as:
* the perceived value of the service; 34
34 Both the FCC and state regulatory commissions have
allowed carriers to price some services on the perceived value
consumers accrue. For example, some local exchange telephone service rates have increased when the number of accessible subscribers reaches a benchmark.
In most states, the Bell Operating Companies and larger
independents charge higher rates in metropolitan areas
than in rural areas-a pricing practice that dates back to
the turn of the century and is traditionally justified in
the belief that the value of the service provided is higher
for subscribers with larger local calling areas. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Releases Semiannual Study on Telephone Trends (Aug. 7,
1991), available at 1991 FCC LEXIS 4305 at *10.
35 Typically an intrastate long distance minute of use significantly exceeds the price of an interstate long distance
minute of use. Ironically, an intrastate state call originated
via a cellular telephone may be significantly cheaper than the
corresponding rate for a call originated over wireline facilities. The rate differential results, in part, from rate-making
policies, which historically have included cross-subsidies to
local exchange service, as opposed to actual cost of service
differences. Additionally, many cellular service packages offer minutes of use without regard to whether they are local or
long distance. See California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505, 1507 (9th
Cir. 1993). ("We recognize the states' concern that, because
the states' rates for intrastate services offset other costs, state
rates will be higher than federal tariffs, and customers may
attempt to use the federal tariff for intrastate as well as interstate communications.").
36 International message telephone service substantially
exceeds domestic rates on a per-minute and mileage-band
basis, primarily because international carriers have negotiated toll revenue division agreements that have failed to drop
commensurately with cost reductions. See Rob Frieden, International Toll Revenue Division: Tackling the Inequities and Inefficiencies, 17 TELECOMM. POL'V 221, 221-33 (1993) [hereinafter

Freiden, International Toll Revenue]; Robert Frieden, Account-

ing Rates, The Business of International Telecommunications and
the Incentive to Cheat, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 111, 111-39 (1991)
[hereinafter Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat].
37 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and pre-existing
FCC regulations differentiate the terms and conditions for
interconnection between carriers as opposed to customercarrier interconnection. The Telecommunications Act orders favorable and potentially zero-cost interconnection between certain types of carriers. For example, § 251 requires
all local exchange carriers "to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
End-users and interexchange ("long distance") carriers must
pay higher "access charges." In re Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
CC Dkt. No. 01-92, FCC 01-132, paras. 5-10 (rel. Apr. 27,
2001).
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* which regulatory agency has jurisdiction
35
over cost allocation and tariffing;
* whether the service is domestic or interna36
tional;
* whether another carrier or end-user seeks
37
facilities interconnection;
* the type of carrier3 or enterprise39 providing service; 40 and
38 During a time when interexchange carrier competitors of AT&T received inferior access to the public switched
telephone network, the Commission authorized discounted
access charges. However, the Commission never stated that
the discounts were cost-based as opposed to a rough justice
solution designed to reflect both inferior access and the
Commission's desire that carriers like MCI acquire market

share. See generally In re Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access ("ENFIA"), Report and Order, 71 F.C.C.2d 440,
(1979), on reconsideration,93 F.C.C.2d 739 (1983), affd in part
and remanded in part sub nona. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC,
712 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Currently, the FCC is considering whether wireless mobile service providers like cellular
radio operators should have to compensate wireline local exchange carriers for terminating calls while such wireline carriers do not have to compensate the wireless operators for
similar call terminations. See In re Interconnection Between
Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd.
5020, 5039, para. 39 (1996) (proposing reciprocal termination between wireline and wireless carriers, including the
possibility of an interim zero termination charge between
carriers); In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial
Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order,II FCC
Rcd. 15,499 (1996), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom.
Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir.
1997), aff d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd.
v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366 (1999), Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 13,042
(1996), Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,738
(1996), Third Order on Reconsideration and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd. 12,460 (1997), appeals docketed,
Second FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 8694
(1999).
39

"Captive" long distance callers from hotel rooms and

callers not familiar with "dial around" options for avoiding

price gouging for pay phone service recognize the vast price
differences for long distance telephone service.
41 Certain types of services have qualified for exemption
from regulatory burdens that impose extra costs. For exam-

ple, enhanced services qualify for non-common carrier status
and its users are exempt from having to pay an access charge
payment otherwise applicable to basic service subscribers. A
1987 FCC initiative to eliminate the exemption generated
substantial opposition by users who claimed the Commission
had proposed to impose a "modem tax."
In 1983 we adopted a comprehensive 'access charge'
plan for the recovery by local exchange carriers (LECs)
of the costs associated with the origination and termination of interstate calls. At that time, we concluded that
the immediate application of this plan to certain providers of interstate services might unduly burden their op-
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0 the type of line or facility providing service 4 1
and whether the service can access the public switched telephone network ("PSTN").

42

III. JURISDICTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP
A perennial candidate for regulatory arbitrage
lies in securing favorable jurisdictional treatment.
On a cost causation basis, traversing a state or international boundary should not make much difference. But how regulators and carriers allocate
costs and which services they attribute cost causation can result in substantially different cost levels
depending on whether telecommunications traffic stays within a state, crosses state borders or
erations and cause disruptions in provision of service to
the public. Therefore, we granted temporary exemptions from payment of access charges to certain classes
of exchange access users, including enhanced service
providers.
In re Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 2 FCC Rcd. 4305, para. 1 (1987) (citing In re
MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983)), terminated by Order, 3 FCC
Rcd. 2631 (1988) (abandoning proposal on grounds that despite the apparent discrimination in charges "the current
state of change and uncertainty" besetting the enhanced services industry justified ongoing exemption from access
charge payments) (proposing to imposed access charges on
enhanced service lines). Currently the FCC requires users of
ISDN services to pay only one Subscriber Line Charge, an
access payment, despite the fact that ISDN circuits can derive
more than one voice-grade equivalent channel.
41
The FCC's access charge regime established a different pricing structure for switched and special access. The former includes regular dial up services and requires end-users
to pay a monthly flat-rated Subscriber Line Charge, currently
$3.50 for residential and small business users and $6.00 for
other business users. The latter includes leased, private line
users, who certify that the line does not "leak" into the PSTN
through the use, for example, of an on-premises switch, like a
Private Branch Exchange, that could couple the private line
with trunks that access the PSTN provided by local exchange
carriers ostensibly for local switched services. See In re MTS/
WATS Market Structure (Phase I), Third Report and Order, 93
F.C.C.2d 241, (1983), modified on reconsideration,97 F.C.C.2d
682, further modification an reconsideration,97 F.C.C.2d 834, partially affd and partially remanded sub nom. NARUC v. FCC, 737
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), further modification, 99 F.C.C.2d
708 (1984); 100 F.C.C.2d 1222, further reconsideration denied,
102 F.C.C.2d 899 (1985); see also In re Investigation of Access
and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101 F.C.C.2d 911 (1985), reconsiderationdenied, In re Investigation of Access and Divesture
Related Tariffs Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification
of Allocations Plan Orders, 102 F.C.C.2d 503 (1985); In re
Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, 101
F.C.C.2d 935 (1985); 47 C.F.R. § 69.104(d) (1), (e) (2000).
42
International private line services, which do not access
the PSTN, are exempt from the accounting rate regime.
Their per minute costs are significantly lower than switched

leaves a nation. Intrastate traffic in the United
States and elsewhere typically triggers higher retail rates than interstate traffic, even for routes of
equal distance.4 3 Similarly, international traffic
may cost several times as much as domestic rates
44
of equal mileage.
Given a significant gap between services, as a
function of jurisdictional classification, arbitrage
opportunities abound. Entrepreneurs have engaged in creative traffic routing to shoehorn services into a preferred jurisdiction. Traffic that
originates and terminates within a single state nevertheless may traverse an adjacent state simply to
avoid intrastate ratemaking and the jurisdiction of
that state's public utility commission. 45 Until Caservices. Undetected private line leakage has become commonplace making it possible for resellers to provide a service
functionally equivalent to international message telephone
service at a fraction of the cost. See Rob Frieden, The Impact of
Boomerang Boxes and Callback Services on the Accounting Rate Regime, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PACIFIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(D.
COUNCIL EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 781-90
Wedemeyer & R. Nickelson, eds., 1996).
43 For example, AT&T's One Rate 7¢ Plan and MCI
WorldCom's 70 Plan charge 7¢ per minute on state-to-state
calls but charge from 7¢ to 14¢ on in-state calls depending
on the state. See AT&T, at http://www.att.com (last visited
Apr. 1, 2001); MCI WorldCom, at http://mci.worldcom.com
(last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
44 The FCC analyzed international long distance telephone pricing information in its report, COMMON CARRIER
BUREAU,

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, TRENDS

IN

at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend200.
pdf (Dec. 21, 2000).
45
The FCC and reviewing courts have rejected a "contamination theory" that if applied would subject a telecommunications service to intrastate jurisdiction if any portion of
the service was offered solely within one state: "The 'contamination theory' contemplates that a service or facility used
only partially for intrastate communication is not subject to
Commission jurisdiction." In re United States Dept. of Def. v.
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 38 F.C.C.2d 803, 808, para. 8
n.17 (1973). But cf. In re Petition of the New York Telephone
Company for a Declaratory Ruling with Respect to the Physically Intrastate Private Line and Special Access Channels Utilized for Sales Agents to Computer New York State Lottery
Communications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC
Rcd. 1080, 1080-81, paras. 1-2 (1990) (concluding that the
addition of two physically interstate private lines to a lottery
network that is otherwise comprised of physically intrastate
lines does not require the local exchange carrier providing
the service to classify all of the lottery's special access lines as
interstate); see also In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,2 FCC Rcd.
3528, (1985), denied by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 FCC Rcd. 3528 (1987); In re MTS and WATS
Market Structure, Amendment of Part 36 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of ajoint Board, Decision and
Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 5660, 5661, para. 8 (1989) (establishing
definitive jurisdictional policy on lines having mixed intra-
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nadian long distance telephone rates dropped to
U.S. levels, carriers would transmit traffic via the
U.S. and back into Canada to qualify the traffic
for lower Canada-U.S rates than the higher domestic charges. Similarly, call-back operators
would import dial tone from nations with low in46
ternational calling rates even for domestic calls.

Arbitrageurs find and exploit price margins
whether created by regulation (intrastate versus
interstate rates) or different competitive conditions (high international calling versus lower call47
ing rates).
IV.

SEMANTIC GAMES: PRIVATE VERSUS
COMMON CARRIERS
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when ventures seek preferred legal classifications.
While private carriers used to lack opportunities
to target and serve third parties like their common carrier counterparts, over time, the FCC permitted such marketing, thereby diminishing the
difference between private and common carriage.

48

The rights and responsibilities historically
vested in common carriers tempered their market
power in exchange for reduced liability or insulation from commercial and personal damages
caused by the content carried. 49 Historically, providers of neutral and transparent conduits did not
have to monitor the content carried, nor could
5
they typically refuse access5" to their bottleneck '

Regulatory avoidance and arbitrage also occurs
state and interstate use).
411

See Robert M. Frieden, The Impact of Call-Back and Arbi-

trage on the Accounting Rate Regime, 21 TELECOMM. POLY
819-27 (1997) [hereinafter Frieden, Impact of Call-Back].
47 Market Entry And Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3873, 3927, 3931, paras.
142, 152 (1995) ("The development of private line resale is a
form of arbitrage that will create additional competition,
leading to lower accounting rates.").
48
See generally Rob M. Frieden, Schizophrenia Among Carriers: How Common Carriers and Private Carriers Trade Places, 3
MicHi. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 19 (1997).
49 See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S.

566, 572 (1921) (holding exculpatory clauses in common
carrier tariff limited liability to refunding cost of carriage despite substantial financial damage resulting from non-delivery of a message transmitted only once). See generally Christy
Cornell Kunin, Unilateral Taiff Exculpation in the Era of Competitive Telecommunications, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 907 (1992)

(examining exculpation of common carrier liability).
50 See, e.g., In re Bell System Tariff Offerings, Decision, 46
F.C.C.2d 413, 422, para. 15 (1974), affirmed sub nom. Bell Tel.
Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(mandating access to local exchange facilities); In re Establishment of Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 97, paras. 27-28 (1970), policy
reaffirmed by Proposed Second Report and Order, 34 F.C.C.2d 9,
64-65, paras. 134-35 (1972), adopted by Second Report and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, (1972), on reconsideration, 38 F.C.C.2d

665 (1972) (domestic satellite policy mandates nondiscriminatory, diverse, and flexible access to domestic satellites and
earth station facilities); accord In re Specialized Common Carrier Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 940, paras. 157-58 (1971) (requiring AT&T to allow local exchange
facility access to competing inter-city carriers), reconsideration
denied, 35 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971), affirmed sub nom. Washington

Util. and Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); In re Use of the
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571
(1968) (invalidating local exchange carrier tariff restrictions
on interconnection of customer premises equipment with

the telephone network); In re Telerent Leasing Corp., Decision, 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina
Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976). See generally In re Proposals For

New or Revised Classes Of Interstate and Foreign Message
Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone
Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), Second Report and
Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976), affd sub nom. North Carolina
Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) (preempting the states on the matter of customer premises equipment interconnection with the telephone network).
51
In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 21-22, paras.
58-59 (1980).
A firm controlling bottleneck facilities has the ability to
impede access of its competitors to those facilities. We
must be in a position to contend with this type of potential abuse. We treat control of bottleneck facilities as
prima facie evidence of market power requiring detailed
regulatory scrutiny. Control of bottleneck facilities is
present when a firm or group of firms has sufficient
command over some essential commodity or facility in
its industry or trade to be able to impede new entrants.
Thus bottleneck control describes the structural characteristic of a market that new entrants must either be allowed to share the bottleneck facility or fail.
Id.

See also United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383
(1912) (ordering railroads to provide competitors equivalent
access to bottleneck railway terminal facilities), appeal after remand, 236 U.S. 194 (1915); In reAn Inquiry Into the Use of
the Bands 825-845 Mhz and 870-890 Mhz for Cellular Communications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of
the Commission's Rules Relative to Cellular Communications
Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 495-96, paras.
54-55 (1981) (requiring telephone companies to furnish interconnection to cellular systems upon terms no less
favorable than those used by or offered to wireline carriers),
modified, 89 F.C.C.2d 58 (1982), further modified, 90 F.C.C.2d

571 (1982); In re Need to Promote Competition and Efficient
Use of Spectrum for Radio Common Carrier Services, Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. 2910 (1987), clarified, Order, 2 FCC
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facilities on the basis of content.5 2 ISPs and mobile radio operators serving retail customers operate like common carriers, at least insofar as their
carriage of voice telephony traffic and generated
by such third parties. In the former case, Internetmediated telephony does not constitute common
carriage. However, in the latter case Congress

closed a semantic loophole by deeming all commercial mobile radio services, even if initially classified as private carriage, to be common carriage. 53 Subsequent streamlining of common
carrier regulation applied equally and fairly to
both types of common carriers-incumbents and
54
those classified as private carriers.
The common carrier insulation from liability
would support the development of a ubiquitous
ISP infrastructure and, in turn, promote universal
access to information services. 55 Historically, common carriage has applied exclusively to public
utilities and other providers of essential services.
Policy makers have not yet deemed Internet access so essential as to place it in the same category
as Plain Old Telephone Service ("POTS") as opposed to other desirable, non-common carrier
services like cable television.5 6 Additionally, recent developments in the interpretation of what
Rcd. 4370 (1987), affd on reconsideration,Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,4 FCC Rcd. 2369 (1989); Lin-

coln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1103-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (upholding Commission's order requiring Lincoln Telephone to provide interconnection facilities to
MCI); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir.
1974).
52

In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126

(1989), the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting obscene telephone messages, but overturned the statute's
absolute denial of adult access via telecommunication common carriers to indecent messages that are entitled to First
Amendment protection.
53
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (Aug. 10, 1993) amending the
Communications Act of 1934 to revise, along with other sections, § 332 to authorize the FCC to establish regulatory parity among private and common carrier mobile telecommunication services. The revised § 332 of the Communications Act
defines "commercial mobile service" as "any mobile service
(as defined in section 3(n)) that is provided for profit and
makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or
(B) to such classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the public, as specified by regulation by the Commission." 47 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1) (Supp. IV
1998); see also E. Ashton Johnston, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services: The FCC Attempts to Create Regulatory Symmetry, 2
CoMMLAWAT CONSPECTUS 1, 1 (1994).
54
See generally In re Access Charge Reform, Fifth Report
and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 14,221, (1999), affd sub nom.

WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

constitutes common carriage does not support extending the classification to ISPs or using it as a
vehicle to bolster public policy support for universal Internet service.
The dichotomy between common carriers and
private carriers has grown murky, because of:
* Legislative and regulatory tinkering with the
57
common carrier model;
* Technological innovations;
" A growing body of cases articulating robust
speaker rights of common carriers; 58 and
* Court cases imposing quasi-common carrier
obligations on private carriers 59 and quasipublisher duties on common carriers.: 0
Extension of the common carrier model appears difficult now that common carriers can
avoid many of the traditional requirements and
non-common carriers have acquired some of the
insulation from liability previously available only
to common carriers. The '96 Act requires the application of common carriage classification on
commercial providers of telecommunication services, 6 1 but authorizes the FCC to abandon virtually all regulatory requirements on any common
62
carrier if circumstances favor such deregulation.
On the other hand, the '96 Act provides ISPs with
55 See Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge, supra note 6, at
404-05.
56 In FCCv. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979),
the Supreme Court struck down FCC rules requiring cable
television operators to set aside channel capacity for public,
educational and government use on grounds that cable television does not constitute common carriage.
57
See Rob Frieden, Contamination of the Common Carrier
Concept in Telecommunications, 19 TELECOMM. POL'Y 685

(1995).
58
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980) (striking a restriction
on public utility advertising).
59 See, e.g.,
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994) (requiring cable television operators to carry broadcast television signals).
60 See id. at 650 (imposing a duty to inquire and disclose
whether content is obscene or indecent).
61
Section 153(44) defines telecommunications carrier

"as a common carrier ...

to the extent that it is engaged in

providing telecommunications services." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)
(Supp. IV 1998). Section 332 also requires the FCC to treat as
common carriage the provision of commercial mobile services. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
Section 160(a) of the revised Communications Act or62
ders the FCC to "forbear from applying any regulation or any
provision of... [the Communications Act] to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunication service" if such regulation is no longer necessary to ensure just, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory rates, to safeguard consumers and that
such forbearance would serve the public interest. 47 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (Supp. 1V 1998).
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a quasi-common carrier exemption from liability
for the carriage of material, like obscenity and
copyright violations, if the operator had no knowledge that it carried the offending content.6
V.

THE GAME CONTINUES

Jurisdictional brinkmanship continues despite
the reforms engineered by the '96 Act. ISPs have
created CLEC affiliates with the sole purpose of
qualifying for a compensation stream based on
the jurisdictional view that the link from Internet
subscriber to the ILEC and then onward to the
ISP's CLEC affiliate and finally to the ISP is a local
64
and not an interstate call.

The '96 Act requires reciprocal compensation
between ILECs and CLECs based on the view that
such a compulsory compensation scheme would
encourage market entry and competition in the
local exchange services. 6 5 Reciprocal compensa-

tion presumably would favor incumbents who
would receive more traffic generated by a CLEC.
ILECs sought this transfer payment system in lieu
of a rough justice "sender keep all," "bill and
keep" model, 66 because of the expected asymme-

try in traffic flows, in which small market entrants
with few customers typically would hand off more
traffic for termination by the incumbent to one of
its subscribers than would the incumbent hand off
traffic for termination by a CLEC to one of its cus67
tomers.
ISPs and their CLEC affiliates outsmarted the
ILECs by engineering a local exchange routing
system that guaranteed the CLEC significant traffic originating on ILEC facilities and requiring a
transfer to CLEC facilities, but without the pros63 Historically, common carriers have operated as neutral and transparent conduits, neither knowledgeable of the
content they carry, nor legally responsible for what they
carry. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also provides legal protection for the "[G]ood [S]amaritan" blocking and
screening of offensive material defined as "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
64
See Richard E. Wiley, Communications Law and the Three
C's-Competition, Convergence and Consolidation-Continue,630

PLI/PATr 9, 77 (2000).
65

Id.

"Sender Keep All" and "Bill and Keep" arrangements
refer to the absence of a monetary transfer when carriers
agree to route the traffic of another carrier to yet another
carrier (also known as transiting), or to the final recipient.
66

pect for an off-setting return flow. Internet traffic
originated by an ILEC customer and handed off
to an ISP's CLEC affiliate qualifies for compensation from the ILEC because the traffic is deemed
local in nature. The FCC recently sought to close
the jurisdictional loophole by recognizing that
the end-to-end nature of the Internet-access call
typically delivers the call to an interstate and even
global network; however, the Commission refrained from upsetting in-place interconnection
arrangements and from preempting state public
utility commission jurisdiction over such arrangements. Therefore, Internet access calls trigger the
reciprocal compensation requirement even
though an examination of the origination and termination "end points" of typical Internet calls
proves the interstate nature of most calls. Ironically, in previous instances, the FCC considered
the presence of even a small portion of interstate
calls as "contaminating" an otherwise intrastate
line and subjecting that line to federal and not
state jurisdiction.

VI.

68

INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING RATE
ARBITRAGE

Because international accounting rates69 remain at artificially high levels for many routes,
carriers and their customers strategize on how to
route traffic exempt from the settlement process.
The vehicles for avoiding high accounting rates
include the use of call-back services, which provide dialtone to end-users physically situated in
another country, and linking international private
lines with a switch that secures access to the
PSTN. These options may violate ITU recommenThese terms also refer to a business relationship: "Each carrier sets consumer collection rates and keeps 100%. This allows new entrants, but it does not encourage operators to receive calls because no compensation is given to allow
incoming calls over their system." Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized Telecommunications Trade in the WTO: Implicationsfor Universal Service Policy, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 41 n.203 (1998).
"7
Id. at 40-41 nn.201-03.
68

Id. at 4.

69 For background on how international telecommunications carriers divide toll revenues using the accounting rate
regime, see generally Robert M. Frieden, Falling Through the
Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform at the ITU and
WI'O, 22 TELECOMM. PoL' 963 (1998) [hereinafter Frieden,
Falling Through the Cracks]; Frieden, Impact of Call-Back, supra
note 46; Frieden, International Toll Revenue, supra note 37;
Paul W. Kenefick, A Step in the Right Direction: The FCC Provides
Regulatory Relief in InternationalSettlements and InternationalServices Licensing, 8 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 43, 54 (2000).
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dations 70 and carrier tariffs because they enable
end-users to secure services in a manner that the
carrier did not intend on providing. While such
bypass may expedite reforms, it flouts uniform
rules of the road. For example, the ITU Recommendations on leased international private lines
contemplate the consultation and agreement on
the scope of service. 7 1 Private lines, by definition,
provide closed, intra-corporate networking capabilities, which are not functionally equivalent to
switched public, long distance services.
What is occurring in international telecommunications parallels the grey market in international commercial aviation where carriers look
the other way, or clandestinely collaborate with
ticket resellers, consolidators and brokers who of-

vate lines as a way to fill up excess capacity and
satisfy large-volume user requirements for closed,
internal networks.7 4 Private branch exchanges
and other customer-controlled equipment have
enabled users to interconnect unmetered international private lines with local public switched tele-

line network means that users, who otherwise
would have to use dial up international telephone
circuits, can opt for specially configured private
line access for functionally equivalent service.
Resellers can expand the reach of leaky private
lines with higher capacity switches. Some carriers
and their regulatory overseers do not object to
this type of "pure resale" that does not enhance
leased lines. 76 Resale stimulates overall capacity
demand, and it can reduce outbound international message telephone service ("IMTS") accounting rate liability, particularly where regula77
tory policies block or limit inbound resale.
Some carriers, intent on capturing larger market
shares by aggregating and routing regional traffic
through a "hub," may engineer a complex array
of private lines and acquire both half-circuits on
78
routes to handle accounting rate exempt traffic.
Transiting, the routing of traffic destined for another country across domestic facilities, presents
another opportunity for carriers and new international telephone entrepreneurs alike to engineer
79
innovative new arrangements for users.
Since the early 1990s, the FCC has taken a more
proactive role in accounting rate oversight, looking to encourage carrier and end-user "self help",
by creating routing strategies that collectively

phone networks. 75 Such "leakiness" enables the

make high accounting rates unsustainable.8 0 The

private line subscriber to access users outside the
internal network. Expanded access to a private

FCC also adopted a "get tough" policy with international carriers, including prescribed accounting

70
Recommendation D.1, Sec. 7.1.1 of the ITU's International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee

justify how the new rate does not discriminate against users
paying higher charges for existing offerings subject to accounting rates.
73 Veronica M. Ahern et al., Developments in the International Marketplace, 427 PLI/PAT 273, 283 (1995).
74 See id. at 325.
75
Id. at 287.
76
Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat, supra note 36, at 122.
77 Id. at 135.
78
Id. at 112.
79
Even companies with limited budgets can get into the
international telecommunications business and exploit high
accounting rate and end user charge differentials. A "boomerang box" enables callers, in high cost foreign locations, to
place a call to the United States, hang up and soon receive a
call from the United States with the intended call recipient
on the line. At the micro-level, the foreign caller avoids hav-

72
fer seats at rates well below the published tariff.

In international telecommunications, sophisticated users and system integrators design private
line networks that avoid accounting rates liability.73 Carriers originally offered unmetered pri-

Blue Book, Vol. 11, Fascicle 11.1, General Tariff Principles,

Charging and Accounting in International Telecommunications Services (1991). The Recommendation suggested that
administrations can condition, consult and agree to the
scope of access to public networks provided to users of international private leased circuits. To the extent that a private
line reseller or end user does not engage in such consultation and erects a system for accounting rate evasion, then the

host country may deny access to the PSTN. However, in many
instances accounting rate avoidance schemes may go undetected by the carrier providing interconnection.
71
See International Telecommunication Union, Telecommunications Standardization Sector, General principles
for the lease of international (continental and intercontinental) private telecommunication circuits and networks, D Series: General tariff principles (1991).
72 International carriers do provide discounted rates to
high volume users. For example, international carries would
offer a discount as an incentive to migrate from unmetered
private lines to metered "virtual" (software defined) private

lines tsing the public switched network. The carriers avoid
application of artificially high accounting rates by creating a
new service category and applying a different and lower accounting rate. Foreign carriers typically have no obligation to

ing to pay the significantly higher charge for originating an
international call, the foreign carrier loses some toll revenues
and the USISC handling the international call accrues some
additional toll revenues. At the macro-level, the transaction
contributes to the expanding United States accounting rate
deficit thereby blunting the foreign carrier's revenue losses
and the USISC's revenue gains.
8o See Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat, supra note 36, at 113.
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rates,"' because it had grown impatient with the
pace of reform in private accounting rate negotiations. While the FCC can properly condition
grants of regulatory authorizations and prescribe
rates for the carriers it regulates, attempts to affect the behavior and the financial performance
of other carriers has generated vocal opposition,
at home and abroad, that the Commission failed
to appreciate international comity and national
sovereignty. 8 2 Nevertheless, a federal court has affirmed the FCC's accounting rate presumptions
and policies." Similarly, a FCC proposal to impose reporting
requirements and other means for overseeing the
extent of participation in the U.S. telecommunications market by foreign-owned firms 84 gener-

ated arguments that it would violate the commitment to "national treatment" of foreign
enterprises (applying identical regulatory rights,
responsibilities and opportunities for foreign81
The Commission proposed to "establish ... determine
and prescribe just and reasonable accounting rates" if
USISCs and their foreign counterparts failed to negotiate
rates downward to an FCC-determined benchmark range. In
re Regulation of Accounting Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-

ing, 5 FCC Red. 4949, para. 19 (1990).
82
When the FCC attempted to influence the timetable
for construction and activation of the TAT-7 overseas cable
through direct negotiations with foreign governments, foreign carriers deemed such activism intrusive of national sovereignty, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia deemed it a violation of the Government in
the Sunshine Act. ITT World Communications, Inc., 77
F.C.C.2d 877, 877-78, para. 2 (1980) (denying petition for
rulemaking on permissible scope of FCC contacts with foreign administrations to negotiate delayed deployment of a
trans-Atlantic submarine communications cable), rev'd, ITT
World Communications v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219 (D.C. Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
83
Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224, 1235
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
84
In re Regulatory Policies and International Telecommunications, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 1022, 1022, para. 1
(1987), Report and Order and Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, 4
FCC Rcd. 7387, 7387, para. 1 (1988), Order on Reconsideration,
4 FCC Rcd. 323 (1989). The FCC has modified its policies
that impose more extensive oversight of foreign owned carriers providing international services from the United States.
See In re Regulation of International Common Carrier Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Red. 577, 583, para.
38 n.35 (1992); Report and Order, 7 FCC 7331 (1992) (retaining more burdensome "dominant carrier" oversight only
where the foreign affiliate of a USISC has the ability to discriminate against unaffiliated carriers through control of bottleneck services and facilities in the foreign market).
85

UNITED

ORG., CULTURE,

NATIONS

EDUC.

SCIENTIFIC

AND

CULTURAL

TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION, QUESTIONS AND

ANswERs, QUESTION 12, WHAT IS TIHE "NATIONAL TREATMENT"

at http://www.unesco.org/culture/industries/
trade/htmleng/questionl2.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
PRINCIPLE?,
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owned carriers as for domestic carriers). 85 The

FCC subsequently decided to calibrate the scope
of regulatory oversight of foreign carriers to the
degree of market access afforded U.S. carriers,
particularly the extent to which U.S. service providers may use leased international private lines to
access the PSTN in foreign locales. 86 This mechanism provides strong leverage for achieving market access parity by linking the scope of inbound
U.S. market access with reciprocal opportunities
87
for outbound traffic.
Reliance on proliferating private line resale redirected the FCC from confrontation with foreign
carriers over their sovereign right to negotiate accounting rates to "procedural reforms that remove any U.S. regulatory impediments to lower,
more economically efficient, cost-based accounting rates .
,s"88
The Commission assumed that if
resale were available on an equivalent basis, inbound and outbound, then the incumbent faciliThe National Treatment principle means that imported
and locally produced goods should be treated equally.
The same should apply to foreign and domestic services,
as well as to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights
and patents. This principle of giving others the same
treatment as one's own nationals is also found in all the
three main WTO agreements (Article III of GATT, Article 17 of the CATS and Article III of the TRIPS), although once again it is handled slightly differently in
each of these. National treatment only applies once a
product, service or item of intellectual property has entered the market.
id.
86
See In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in
the U.S. Telecommunications Market, Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Red. 18,158, 18,160-65 (2000); Report and Order
on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd. 23,891, 23,894, para. 2 (1997)
(replacing an "effective competitive opportunities" test with a
looser "open entry" standard for WTO Members when considering foreign carrier entry into the U.S. market by means
of authorizations to provide facilities-based, switched resale,
and resold non-interconnected private line service, authorizations to exceed the 25% foreign ownership benchmark and
cable landing licenses).
87
See In re Cable & Wireless, Inc., Memorandum Opinion,
Order and Authorization, 9 FCC Rcd. 7283, 7283, para. 4
(1994); In re Cable & Wireless, Inc., Order and Certification, 8
FCC Rcd. 1664, 1664, para. 2 (1993); In re Fonorola Corp.
Application for Authority Under Section 214 of the Communications Act to Resell Facilities of Other Common Carriers
to Provide Domestic Carriers Interconnection with Canadian
Carriers, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certification, 7 FCC
Rcd. 7312 (1992), Order on Reconsideration, 9 FCC Red. 4066,
4071, para. 25 (1994) (authorizing British and Canadian
resellers to provide international service upon finding that
the foreign country on the other end of the circuit provides
equivalent opportunities to U.S. carriers to resell interconnected private lines).
88 In re Regulation of International Accounting Rates, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 3552, 3552, para. 1 (1991).
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ties-based carriers would perceive new incentives
to negotiate lower accounting rates to dissuade
customers from migrating to private line and resale options. Facilities-based international telecommunications carriers, which face competition
from resellers8 9 unencumbered by accounting
rate liability, may view high accounting rates as
imposing a floor on how low they can price end
user rates "to prevent diversion of ... customers
to a reseller." 90 Presumably, resellers providing
outbound services from the United States will acquire market share, thereby reducing the number
of IMTS outbound minutes subject to accounting
rate settlements. 9 ' A facilities-based carrier, refusing to negotiate accounting rates closer to cost,
would "receive fewer revenues from its IMTS customers and, thus, would wind up with fewer revenues overall."

VII.

92

THE INTERNET AS A MEDIUM FOR
ARBITRAGE

The Internet has evolved into a vibrant medium
for communications, entertainment, education
and commerce. One of the primary drivers for the
growing consumer reliance on Internet-mediation
involves the ability of the Internet to offer instant
"real time" delivery of digital packets in addition
to the store and forward, non-real time delivery of
89
K. Cheong & M. Mullins, InternationalTelephone Service
Imbalances, 15 TELECOMM. POL'y 107, 116 (1991) ("Resale [of
leased private lines] would bypass the accounting rate mechanism-a major cost to the traditional carrier mode of operation-and increase the feasibility of creating unidirectional
traffic channels."). If resale remains unidirectional, United
States facilities-based carriers and consumers will not benefit:
resale occurring only in the inbound United States direction
would increase the United States accounting rate deficit. Resale must be bi-directional to have the effect of "expos[ing]
the differential between tariffs and accounting rates and ultimately force traditional carriers to renegotiate accounting
rates closer to service costs." Id. at 116-17.
90 In re Regulation of International Accounting Rates,
First Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 559, 561, para. 16 (1991)
(stating "[t]o the extent that the accounting rate is above
cost, the underlying carrier will face a constraint on how

much of a reduction in its revenues it can tolerate.").
9'
Id.
92 Id.
93 This pricing scenario presupposes that an ISP does
not incur usage sensitive prices for any major element of service. For many Asia-Pacific routes, the need to access network
access points in far away locations, such as the United States,
does impose significant costs. To offset the charges of facilities-based telecommunications carriers, ISPs may charge end
users on a usage sensitive basis, for example, an hourly
surcharge after an initial allocation of access time. See Rob

packets in applications like electronic mail. Real
time "streaming" of information packets means
that the Internet can serve as a medium for audio
and video programming and also for telephone
services.
Absent network congestion, the cost to carry or
process an additional minute of Internet traffic
approaches zero because the incremental cost is
near zero. 93 This pricing system enhances consumer welfare, stimulates usage and revenue generation and accrues positive networking externalities. 9 4 The Internet adds thousands of new sites

and users daily with such expanded access opportunities accruing greater utility for all users. 95 As
long as ample capacity remains available along
with moderate transport and content costs, ISPs
need not meter traffic and can offer service on an
insensitive All You Can Eat ("AYCE") usage basis.
ISPs can offer AYCE service because even as
they have high fixed costs, they incur relatively
low incremental costs absent network congestion.
They can represent that their network extends
globally even though few, outside of a small group
of Tier-i backbone network operators, actually
have built or leased such an extensive array of facilities. 96 Until recently, ISPs have incurred little
additional expense in providing their customers
opportunities to access Internet networks via in7
cumbent telecommunication carriers' facilities.1
Frieden, Does a HierarchicalInternet Necessitate MultilateralIntervention?, 26 N.C.J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 361, (2001) [hereinafter Frieden, Multilateral Intervention?].
94 A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the Internet does not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users and points of coimunications. See also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV.
479 (1998); See generallyJohn Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70
(1985); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
95 See Susan Stellin, Compressed Data; Number of New Internet Users is Growing,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at C3 (citing
a report released by the Pew Internet and American Life Project estimating that the number of American adults with Internet access grew in the last six months of 2000 by 16 million).
96
See Frieden, Multilateral Intervention?, supra note 93, at
363.
97 The author acknowledges that "free rider" opportunities via other ISPs are becoming more scarce, as the Internet
becomes more hierarchical and larger ISPs demand and receive payments for providing transit services to ISPs with
fewer customers, less bandwidth and limited sources of desirable content. See Rob Frieden, Last Days of the Free Ride? The
Consequences of Settlement-Based Interconnection for the Internet,
INFO, Vol. 1, No. 3, 225-38, available at http://
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Accordingly, ISPs have had opportunities to tap
into the same financial and distance-insensitive
service opportunities as telecommunication entrepreneurs that exploit the porousness of telecommunication networks and relative ease in accessing the PSTN. One can consider Internetmediated telephony j 8 in the same context as
other technological innovations like call-back,!' '
switched hubbing,"11 1 refile, 111l and international
simple resale1t12 that provide new, lower-priced alternatives to the "retail" rate for toll telephone
services.
Internet telephony shifts the balance of market
power from carriers, which traditionally have set
prices on a cost-plus basis, to consumers who may
emphasize price and consider telephony a commodity business. If telephony minutes of use become fungible, with voice traffic subordinate to
an increasing volume of data, then service providers will have limited, if any, ability to saddle users
with rates significantly above cost, despite the fact
that carriers do plow back a large percentage of
any financial surplus to achieve universal service
www.camfordpublishing.com (1999).
98 See Robert Frieden, Dialingfor Dollars: Will the FCC Regulate Internet Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER TiciH. L.J. 47,
54 (1997) [hereinafter Frieden, Dialingfor Dollars].

"'Callback' is a technology used to provide international telecommunications service from a foreign country
99

through a .

.

. switch [in the U.S. or other nation with low

collection charges and options for private line resale and
routing options that reduce or eliminate accounting rate liability]." In re Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. International Telecom, Ltd., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12

FCC Rcd. 15,001, 15,002, para. 4 n.10 (1997). See also
Frieden, Falling Through the Cracks, supra note 69, at 975;
Frieden, Impact of Call-Back, supra note 46, at 819 (1997); Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
Committee for Information, Computer and Communications
Policy, Refile and Alternative Calling Procedures: Their Impact on
Accounting Rates and Collection Charges, OECD/GD(95)19
(Paris, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 OECD Refile and Call-back Report]; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy, New Technologies and Their Impact on the
Accounting Rate System, OECD/GD(97)14 (Paris, 1997)
[hereinafter 1997 OECI) Accounting Rate Study].
100 The FCC defined switched hubbing as "the routing of
U.S. switched traffic over U.S. international private lines,
whether resold or facilities based, that terminate in
equivalent countries and then forwarding that traffic to a
third, non-equivalent country by taking at published rates
and reselling the international service of a carrier in the
equivalent country." In re Policy Statement on International
Accounting Rate Reform, Policy Statement, 11 FCC Rcd. 3146,
3147, para. 12, n.9 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Accounting Rate
Policy Statement].
101
Refile or the hubbing of traffic is using one coun-
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and infrastructure development objectives.1 0 3

The onset of Internet-mediated telephony has
the potential for bringing to a head the long simmering debate over the propriety of pricing telecommunication services above cost, in part to promote a universal service mission. It also may
trigger closer examination of what constitutes the
actual cost a carrier incurs to route a minute of
telecommunication traffic. The 1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study observed:
[A] polarisation [exists] between a group of countries
with relatively competitive prices and low accounting
rates, and a second group of countries with prices significantly above cost ...

This danger is real, especially

between OECD countries and a number of non-OECD
countries who have difficulty in envisaging the benefits
which they can attain from competitive telecommunication markets. 114

VIII.

INTERNET TELEPHONY THREATENS
THE STATUS QUO

Currently, international accounting rates for
most routes substantially exceed the total cost intry to collect traffic and switch this traffic to other countries ... For example, the price of a call from DenmarkFinland-Australia is cheaper than a direct call from Denmark to Australia (... US $0.46 + US $1.03 compared to

US $2.01). In this case a third country calling service [using conventional switched services] would be viable having a margin of US $ 0.52 per minute.
See 1995 OECD Refile and Call-back Report, supra note 99, at 11.

102
International simple resale ("ISR") involves the use
of a private line by more than one customer with access to
the public switched network at one or both ends. ISR
presents both profit-enhancing opportunities and bypass
threats to facilities-based carriers providing the capacity. On
one hand, "[flacility providers today find that it is more profitable to provide excess capacity to resellers and allow them
to find customers and market this capacity rather than marketing this capacity themselves. Resale allows more segmented and flexible marketing including more market ori-

ented prices." 1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study, supra note

99, at 36. On the other hand, "ISR service provision by-passes
the international charging and settlements system, and therefor places significant [downward] pressure on accounting
rates." /d. at 38.
I." When service rates decline to levels approximating
marginal cost, carriers do not have revenues available to underwrite public policy objectives no matter how laudable.
Such subsidization must come directly from users in the form
of additional line item charges on their bills. See, e.g., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FACT SHEET, TELEPHONE

http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_
Carrier/Factsheets/telephonebills_facts.html (last visited
June 16, 2001).
BILL CHARGES,

I14

1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study, supra note 99, at 32.
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curred by two or more "foreign correspondents"
to switch and route a call from originator to recipient.'0 5 The onset of higher capacity submarine
cables and satellites, coupled with digital signal
processing and switching and circuit multiplication technologies, have significantly reduced permile and per-call costs,' 0

6

although the cost sav-

ings may not be the same for nations lacking the
traffic volumes and funds available to support new
technologies having lower per unit costs. However, absent competitive or regulatory pressure to
reduce accounting rates and retail collection
charges to levels commensurate with such lower
costs, carriers that terminate more calls than they
originate want to maintain the status quo. 10 7 Accordingly, accounting rates continue to overstate
cost and overcompensate some operators:
The pace in introducing competition in international
telecommunication markets and the reform of these
markets is slow, and there is an apparent reluctance in
many cases by governments to accelerate reform in this
105
Carrier correspondents "match" half-circuits to erect
a complete link from call originator to call recipient. The
half-circuit concept operates on the presumption that carrier
correspondents achieve a "whole circuit" by linking two halfcircuits at the theoretical midpoint of a submarine cable, or
at the satellite providing the transmission link. In the submarine cable scenario, each carrier has responsibility to secure
access to circuits linking transmission facilities on its territory
to the location where the cable makes its landfall (referred to
as the cablehead), possibly located in a different nation, and
onward to the midpoint. For more background on international telecommunications operations and policy, see ROB
FRIEDEN,

MANAGING

INTERNET-DRIVEN

TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

(2001);

CHANGE

IN

INTERNA-

ROB FRIEDEN, INTERNA-

TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK (1996).
106
See INFORMAL EXPERT GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,

INT'L TELECOMM.

TIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS,

UNION, THE COST OF INTERNA-

at http://www.itu.int/search (last

visited May 16, 2001) (reporting that the per minute cost for
routing an international telephone call via an INTELSAT satellite including operating expenses is US $0.02 and that factoring all switching, routing, interconnection and administrative costs, including license fees, advertising and taxes "the
average per minute cost of an international call is probably
around $0.25"). Using a total service long run incremental
cost methodology, which factors in a reasonable contribution
to common costs, the FCC established "upper end" settlement rate benchmarks of 15.4¢ for carriers in upper income
nations; 19.1¢ for carriers in middle-income nations and
23.4¢ for carriers is lower income countries. See In re International Settlement Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC

Rcd. 6184, 6203, para. 47 (1996). The Commission proposed
a 9-22¢ upper range for benchmark settlement rates for carriers in upper income nations; 12-26¢ for carriers in middle
income nations and 13-33¢ for carriers in lower income nations. Id. at 6203, para. 48. In its 1997 international settlement policy order the Commission responded to foreign carrier and government opposition to its proposed timetable by

creating a fourth income category and by extending the tran-

area. It therefore cannot be expected that significant
changes in prices (collection charges) and accounting
rates will take
place given present attitudes and policy
108

frameworks.

In the absence of competitive necessity, an ag-

gressive campaign by regulators in sufficient numbers or widespread use of Internet telephony and
other arbitrage tactics, many carriers continue to
benefit from traffic retardation strategies that reduce outbound calling and expand asymmetry be1l
tween inbound and outbound traffic volumes. '
For some nations, purposefully high accounting
rates and commensurately high collection charges
accrue financial dividends by reducing the volume of outbound traffic that otherwise would offset at least a portion of the settlement surplus. I0
Even as they may reduce some high-profit operator-assisted outbound international calls, call-back
and other call-reorigination services''' increase
the volume of inbound calls, at least some of
112
which trigger an accounting rate settlement.
sition period. See In re International Settlement Rates, Report

and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 19,806, 19,809, para. 6 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Accounting Rate Report and Order]. The FCC estab-

lished the following benchmarks and timetables for compliance: U.S.-licensed carriers operating on routes to upper
income countries have one year from the effective date of
this Order (until Jan. 1, 1999) to reach the applicable benchmark rate of 15¢ with carriers in upper income countries. Id.
at 19,815-16, para. 19. U.S.-licensed carriers have two years,
or until Jan. 1, 2000, to reach the applicable rate of 19¢ with
upper middle income countries, and until Jan. 1, 2001, to
reach the same rate with lower middle income countries. Id.
at 19,881, para. 157. They have until Jan. 1, 2002, to reach
the applicable 23¢ rate with low income countries, and an
additional year, until Jan. 1, 2003, to do so with countries
with a telephone line penetration rate (teledensity) of less
than one. Id.
107
See Lawrence J. Spivak, From International Competitive
Carrierto the WJ1O: A Survey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51 FED. COMM. L.J.

111, 120 (1998).
11O

1997 OECD Accounting Rate Study, supra note 99, at 6.

Many international carriers have objected to the
FCC's campaign to reduce international accounting rate tactics on fairness and jurisdictional levels. However, an appellate court has ruled that the FCC's settlement rate prescription did not violate domestic or international law, nor did it
impose its jurisdiction extraterritorially. See generally Cable
and Wireless P.L.C v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
109

S11) See Robert Frieden, Without Public Peer, The Potential
Regulatory and Universal Service Consequences of Interest Balkanization, 3 VA. J. L. & TECH. 8, 24-25 [hereinafter Frieden,
Without Public Peer] (1998).
H'
1996 Accounting Rate Policy Statement, 11 FCC Rcd. at

3147, para. 12 ("[C]ountry direct benefits U.S. [and other]
consumers but inflates the settlements deficit by converting
foreign-originated traffic into U.S.-billed calls.").
112
In re International Settlement Rates, Report and Order,
12 FCC Rcd. 19,806 (1997). The traditional settlement rate
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For nations requiring carriers to route return traffic proportionate with what they received inbound,""n carriers from other nations with more
outbound traffic than inbound traffic face the potential for expanding settlement deficits if outbound calling continues to grow even as demographic characteristics or regulatory policies
elsewhere continue to dampen demand for inbound calling. 114 Carriers with inbound traffic
surpluses typically operate in small and developing countries, but others operate in nations that
appear to have a strategy of deliberately maintaining high accounting and collection rates.' 15
Outbound international call retardation strategies create pent up demand and stimulate accounting rate and collection arbitrage opportunities and incentives by users and entrepreneurial
carriersI'" to find ways to route traffic that reverse
the accounting rate settlement or avoid triggering
one entirely.'
A settlement surplus generates a
source of hard currency for telecommunications
infrastructure development, and such transfer
payments from users in developed nations to carriers in developing ones can enhance consumer
welfare and promote networking externalities. On
the other hand, no guarantees exist that only developing countries will pursue an outbound call
retardation strategy or that beneficiaries of settlement surpluses will use the funds for infrastructure development as opposed to funding the general treasury or stock dividends. Likewise, reduced
outbound international calling may retard trade,
industry and integration of a nation regionally
and globally.
system assumes that a customer's physical location determines the place of origin of an international call, with the
carrier in the originating country paying a settlement rate to
the carrier in the terminating country. However, service innovations such as call-back allow customers to change the
originating country for settlement purposes. The result is
that many more calls are originated for settlement purposes
from countries like the United States with vigorous retail and
wholesale markets than in monopoly markets that lack similar competition. These traffic routing patterns will only be
exacerbated as countries implement their market access conmitments tinder the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement. 1i.
Call-back operators look for opportunities to reduce accounting rate exposure, through refile, and to avoid them entirely
by routing traffic via private lines that "leak" into the PSTN.
113 For nations with large populations, high gross domestic products, large expatriate and immigrant communities,
and multiple facilities-based carriers, like the United States,
operators may have collection rates at levels below one-half
the accounting rate. Such carriers expect to recoup outbound traffic losses with inbound traffic subject to an ac-
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In the accelerated pace of product and service
life cycles common to the Internet, telephone services have quickly evolved from an awkward personal computer-mediated curiosity to a commercial service available not just from computers but
from conventional telephones as well. Internet telephony has the potential to serve as a major
threat to the international accounting rate regime
and possibly as well to how telecommunication
carriers price retail long distance services for two
primary reasons:
(1) the Internet architecture provides for efficient facilities loading, including the ability of telecommunications networks dedicated for the data services to handle voice
traffic at near zero cost, absent congestion; and
(2) regulatory policies throughout the world
largely exempt providers of Internet services from having to subject their traffic to
accounting rate settlements and having to
pay the interconnection charges and contributions to universal telecommunications service funding imposed on telecommunications carriers.
Internet telephony constitutes a formidable vehicle for compressing telecommunication carrier
margins on telephone services. ISPs can easily add
telephony traffic onto their data lines and technological innovations provide ways to inject Internet
voice traffic into the PSTN for the "last mile" delivery to call recipients.'
Given the large difference between ISPs' costs incurred in providing Internet telephony and the retail charges for
counting rate settlement that would overcompensate the carrier for terminating the call.
114 See Frieden, The Incentive to Cheat, supra note 36, at

118-19.

11
A thriving international "dial-a-porn" industry has developed in such diverse and unpredicted places as Guyana,
Russia and Ttvalu in part because operators can tap into a

share of comparatively higher accounting rates well above
the FCC's settlement rate prescription. See Kenneth R. Propp,
Eroding Structure of InternationalTelecommunications Regulation:
The Challenge of Call-Back Services, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 493, 519
(1996).
116

Many facilities-based carriers offer services with lower

per minute charges than conventional, tip International Direct Distance dialing. While such carriers do not want to cannibalize high margin services, they recognize the need to
compete with call-back operators.
i17
See Frieden, Without Public Peer, supra note 110, at

124-25.

111

See, e.g.,

EFFICIENT NETWORKS, VOICE

CRATING VOICE AND DATA TRANSMISSION IN

OVER ATM:
DSL

INTE-

SERVICE,

at,
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conventional telephone services, especially inter-

national rates, ISPs can profit handsomely by pricing service well below the preexisting retail toll
charge. This exploitation of a wide pricing differential constitutes a type of arbitrage as the ISP can
make a business case for delivering services to
consumers at significantly lower costs. ISPs have
plenty of margin from which to work due to the
difference between their actual costs and the imputed cost established by route specific accounting rates based on conventional telephony.
IX.

TECHNOLOGY PROVIDES ARBITRAGE
OPPORTUNITIES

Internet telephony uses the digital, packetswitched nature of the Internet, along with its
routing and addressing standards to provide real
time, audio conferencing.1 19 Internet switching
and routing technology manages the transmission
and processing of text, graphics, data, audio or
video. The Internet's TCP/IP protocol' 20 prohttp://www.efficient.com/tlc/whitepapers/voatm/
voatm.pdf (1999).
119
See id.
120
See Richard Allan Horning, Has Hal Signed a Contract:
The Statute of Frauds in Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 253, 258 (1996).
The common denominator for e-mail communications
is the use of a standard programming protocol, TCP/IPTransmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol-upon
which inter-computer communications are based. The
TCP protocol divides messages into packets, which are
marked with a sequence number and the address of the
recipient. TCP also inserts error control information.
The packets are then sent over the network to the addressee. The routing of the individual packets varies,
with IP controlling the transport of the packets to the
remote host computer. At the remote host, TCP receives
the packets and checks for errors. When an error occurs,
TCP asks for the particular packet to be re-sent. Once all
the packets have been received, TCP will then use the
sequence number to reconstruct the original message. It
is the job of IP to get the packets from one place to another; it is the job of TCP to manage the flow and insure
that the data are correct.
Id.
121
See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, at http://www.isoc.org/internet/
history/brief.html#Origins (Aug. 4, 2000); see also Rob
Frieden, Managing Internet-Driven Change in InternationalTelecommunications (2001).
122
See Robert D. Fram et al., Altered States: Electronic Commerce and Owning The Means of Value Exchange, 1999 STAN.
TECH. L. REiv. 2, XI. Appendix C: Glossary of Terms, at http:
//str.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/99_STLR_2/index.htm
(1999).
Packets are network message fragments including the
message fragment itself, a header with identifying infor-

vides a standard vehicle for subdividing content,
such as a voice conversation, into a stream of
packets that are routed via any available path be1
tween the sender and intended call recipient. 1
Each packet has space reserved for destination information so that intermediary routing facilities
can read "header" data to determine how and
where to send the packets toward their intended
destination. 122 Headers include a sequence of digits that correspond to an Internet address, much
like the numbering sequence in direct distance dialing via telephone. 123 However, IP addresses do
not correspond to a specific geographical region
as provided by telephone area codes.
Packet switching efficiently uses available
switching and routing capacity. Likewise, it can
operate despite outages, blockages and busy conditions because the Internet Protocol addressing
scheme makes it possible for multiple efforts to
route traffic onward in the event that initial efforts fail.

12 4

Resending misdelivered or un-

received packets and routing them via different
mation about the message fragment, error control data,
and addressing data. As a message fragment travels
along the network, each layer or gateway adds routing
information to the packet before passing it to the next
destination. Packets are not full messages; each message
a user sends (for example, a typical e-mail communication) is broken up into packets and transmitted across
the Internet via the best available routes.
Id.
123
SeeJonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 194 (2000).
In any system of networked computing, there has to be
some mechanism enabling one computer to locate another. If I want to send e-mail to a buddy in Boise, the
system needs to have some way to find his mail server so
that it can direct the information there. Internet engineers came up with this solution: Each 'host' computer
connected to the Internet was assigned an Internet protocol (IP) address, which consisted of a unique 32-bit
number, usually printed in dotted decimal form, such as
128.127.50.224. Dr. Jon Postel of the University of Southern California's Information Sciences Institute (ISI) assumed the task of assigning blocks of IP addresses to
computer networks. Because no two computers had the
same IP address, it was possible to locate any computer
on the Internet simply by knowing its IP address. TCP/
IP made possible a system of routing that permitted a
user to dispatch a message onto the Internet, knowing
only the IP address of the computer he wished to reach,
with confidence that the message would eventually reach
its intended destination.
Id.
124
SeeJonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges,
and Other Flotsam Of The Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG.
211, 215 (1999).
The Internet is a network of networks, communicating
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and possibly circuitous links requires software
processing to reassemble the packets in proper order.125 For traffic and services that do not require
immediate, real-time delivery-such as electronic
mail-possible delays and reassembly present little problem. However, Internet telephony requires immediate, real time delivery of the packets in their proper order. Any delay, loss or
improper sequencing of packets will result in distortion, or the temporary loss of the audio stream.
Heretofore, Internet telephony has lacked the
quality, reliability and security to be considered
26
comparable to conventional telephone services.'
Traditional telephone services use circuit switching that sets up a dedicated link between call originator and call recipient. 127 This technology provides high-quality service and reliability because a
dedicated pathway exists, as opposed to the virtual, "on the fly" links provided via the Internet.
However, a dedicated pathway may be technologically wasteful in the sense that switching, routing
using packet-switching technology. A key part of that
technology is the Internet Protocol (IP), which provides
the intelligence to transmit packets successfully even if
source and destination are on different physical networks. IP converts multiple physical networks, which
may run on completely different hardware, into a single
logical network. Any computer on any of the underlying
networks can thus communicate with any other. On a
more prosaic level, the Internet is a set of computers,
packet routers, and the physical communications paths
(such as copper wire, or fiberoptic cable, or terrestrial
wireless, or satellite transmission, or coaxial cable) connecting them. A packet router is a data communications
device whose job it is to tell packets where to go; each
time a packet hits a router, the router examines that
packet's address information and determines where to
send it next.

Id. (citations omitted).
125
Ari Lanin, Who Controls the Internet? States' Rights And
The Reawakening of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1423, 1425-26 (2000).
Each computer on the Internet is connected to a small
number of other computers. If one information route is
down or congested, smart networking allows for information to take any number of alternative routes. Segmented messages ensure that a single message will never
be sent in a single block, but instead will be broken
down into smaller blocks known as 'packets.' When a
message is sent, these 'packets' are individually transferred and, inevitably, distributed through different
routes on the network. When all the packets arrive at the
destination colnputer, they are reassembled into the
original message.
Id.
126 See generally Frieden, Dialingfor Dollars, supra note 98;
Dennis W. Moore, Jr., Regulation of the Internet and Internet Telephony Through the hnposition of Access Charges, 76 TEX. L. REV.
183, 184-85 (1997).

and transmission capacity lies dormant during
pauses in a conversation.28 Packet switching technology efficiently fills in gaps with other traffic so
that traffic may traverse different routes and arrive at different times in getting to the same destination.1 29 In circuit switching, all parts of a traffic
stream traverse the same pathway, which provides
13
greater quality assurance. What Internet telephony lacks in quality of service and reliability it makes up in lower costs and
the ability to narrow the gap between carriers'
costs and retail charges. 131 However, some users

may care more about reliability of service and less
about savings. Currently, Internet traffic cannot
be easily classified by priority of service or by type
of application. Best efforts at routing of traffic
may not provide the security, safety and reliability
a user may require. For those willing to take the
qualitative risk, the financial savings are significant.'3 2 However, Internet telephony consumers
have to incur some initial, up-front costs. Unlike
127

Peter H. Salus, The Net: A Brief History Of Origins, 38

671, 674 (1998).
When you place a phone call, your instrument connects

JURIMETRICSJ.

to a local switch. If this is a long distance call, the switch
puts the call onto an appropriate trunk, and at the other
end another switch connects you to the other local number. For the duration of that call, you are in control of
that circuit. This is therefore called circuit switching.
Id.
128
In other words a circuit switched link cannot carry
other traffic even when it is not being used. Circuit switching
establishes dedicated pathways that by nature cannot be
shared.
129
See Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 37, 50
(1999).
13(
Circuit switching may require the use of several different telecommunication network facilities along the link
from call originator to call recipient. However, no uncertainty exists as to who provides the switching and traffic routing functions as would be the case for Internet traffic. Conventional dial up telephone traffic traverses as few as one
carrier's network while Internet traffic can transit an indeterminate number.
III The cheapest form of Internet telephony imposes no
charge beyond the stink investment in a personal computer
and Internet access. See generally Internet and Telecoms Convergence Consortium at http://itel.mit.edu/ (last visited

Apr. 20, 2001);
INFORMATION

WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND

SERVICES POLICIES, DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE,

TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, INTERNET VOICE TELEPHONY DEVELOPMENTS, at http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/it/cm/prod/

tisp97-3e.pdf (1998) (giving additional background on Internet telephony) (explaining Internet Voice Telephony Developments).
1_32
Even when Internet-mediated telephone services are
accessible from conventional telephones, in lieu of personal
computers, the cost savings are significant. For example,
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conventional telephone service, the cheapest
types of Internet-mediated telephony require a
significant initial capital outlay of about $2,000 for
a personal computer, modem, sound card, speakers, microphone, software and Internet access.
Conventional telephone services use a telephone
handset, an inexpensive, "dumb" terminal, but
users incur per minute charges that can exceed
$1.00 a minute for many international destinations. Internet telephony provided on a conventional dial up basis requires an ISP to install devices that can convert circuit switched telephone
traffic into packets and vice versa. 133 Additionally,
these devices must provide a routing function, using the Internet Protocol to bring traffic to a facility (commonly referred to as a point of presence)
in the vicinity of the call recipient.
X.

FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PRICING

Internet telephony provides profitable opportunities for incumbents and newcomers alike to offer services functionally equivalent to conventional telephony, but treated in a manner that
subjects the service to little or no regulation and
accrues lower operational costs. 134 Entrepreneurs

savor the opportunity to exploit financial and regulatory anomalies and asymmetries in telecommunications .135
Internet telephony has the potential to migrate
traffic from conventional telecommunications
networks. 136 Incumbent carriers surely do not
want to encourage such a migration as it will crenet2phone, an Internet telephony provider, currently adver-

tises a 3.9V per minute rate for calls within the United States,
with many international calls costing less than 25¢ per minute. The retail, occasional calling rates of conventional carriers exceed these rates by several hundred percent. See
net2phone, at http://www.net2phone.coni (last visited Apr.
20, 2001).
133
See Robert Scoble, Internet Telephony Primer,at http://
www.techtv.com/callforhelp/projects/story/
0,23008,2190782,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2001) (providing a technical background on how Internet telephony
works).
134
See Nicholas C. Spatafore, Stuck in the Middle, TELEPHONY, Aug. 28, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7092846 [hereinafter Spatafore.
135

For example, an entrepreneur could lease private

lines, link them with the PSTN and offer a long distance telephone service to individual consumers who otherwise would

ate downward pressure on all telephone toll rates
and cannibalize retail rates. 3

7

On the other hand,

incumbent carriers probably will determine that
they are better served financially by providing the
transmission capacity for Internet telephony, albeit at lower margins, than if they lose customers'
traffic entirely. The massive increase in domestic
and international broadband telecommunication
capacity reflects the view that carriers can make
up in volume what they will lose in margin.

XI.

3

THE PROBLEMS IN REGULATORY
ASYMMETRY

Any regulatory regime applied exclusively to Internet applications runs the risk of creating a dichotomy in regulatory rights and responsibilities
between providers of functionally equivalent services. Many of the services available via the Internet provide a faster, better, cheaper and
smarter option to preexisting services. The Internet provides a convenient, user-friendly medium for acquiring news and entertainment and
engaging in all sorts of commercial transactions.
A bias or intention not to regulate or to regulate
such activities lightly may contrast significantly
with a preexisting and more intrusive regulatory
model. Governments should not automatically extend the application of legacy regulatory regimes 39 to Internet-mediated equivalent services.
Also, governments should not deregulate incumbent services simply because Internet options
have become available, while governments have
opted to apply a less burdensome regulatory regime to Internet services.
The onset of Internet-mediated services does
not qualify for bulk discounts offered only to high volume
private line users.
136 See Tuan N. Samahon, The First Amendment Case
Against FCC IP Telephony Regulation, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 493,
496-97 (1999).
137 See Spatafore, supra note 134.
138 See id.
139 See Jason Oxman, FCC OPP Working Paper 31, The
FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet, 24-25, at http://
www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (1999).
New technologies, while perhaps similar in appearance
or in functionality, should not be stuffed into what may
be ill-fitting regulatory categories in the name of regulation. Rather, the Commission should continue the approach of studying new technologies and only stepping
in where the purpose for which the Commission was created, protecting the public interest, demands it.
Id.
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present a regulatory challenge to governments,
particularly those disinclined to treat Internet-mediated services as equivalents to services transmitted and delivered via traditional media. The juxtaposition of different regulatory regimes typically
also creates an asymmetry that has the potential
for tilting the competitive playing field in favor of
the less regulated service. 14
'" To the extent regulation can impose financial and operational burdens, the service provider subject to greater regulation typically suffers a competitive disadvantage
vfs-a-vis the less regulated operator. 14 Governments should generate compelling justifications
for establishing different regulatory regimes in
view of the potential for such asymmetry to impact the marketplace attractiveness of one service
vfs-a-vfs others.
Regulatory dichotomies work best when techno42
logical categories remain discrete and absolute. 1
But they surely do not work when technological
convergence results in porous service categories
and diversification by operators.

43

When cable

telephone and ISPs offer telephone services func140
Kasey A. Chappelle, Comment, The End of the Beginning. Theories and PracticalAspects of Reciprocal Compensationfor

Internet Traffic, 7 CoMMLAw CONSPEcrus 393, 406 (1999)
("For convergence to be a reality, diverging regulatory structures cannot exist for communications systems that provide
essentially the same service.").
141
See Francois Bar et al., Defending the Internet Revolution
in the BroadbandEra: When Doing Nothing is Doing Harm, Econ-

omy, at http://e-conomy.berkeley.edu/publications/wp/
ewpl2.html (1999) (supporting symmetrical regulatory requirements for Internet access between common carriers
and cable television systems).
142
For example a regulatory dichotomy may impose
greater regulatory burdens on an incumbent to promote
market entry by competitors using new technologies. Advocates for asymmetric regulation may:
insist on the need to counterbalance the competitive advantages enjoyed by the incumbents by virtue of the
favorable position assured them by the monopoly conditions reigning in the [current] market ....
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tionally similar to that available from telephone
companies, regulators cannot sustain preexisting
service dichotomies. Heretofore, government regulators have assumed that incumbent telephone
service providers, which have dominant market
shares, should operate as common carriers and offer the best technologies and wherewithal to
achieve universal service goals.' 44 Regulators typically assume that market entrants, like ISPs, other
enhanced service providers and resellers of basic
transmission capacity, do not have the potential to
acquire a dominant market share, or that they of45
fer ancillary, non-common carrier services.'
While incumbent telephone companies incur significant financial duties to serve costly remote areas, the newcomers enjoy exemptions from having to pay charges for accessing the PSTN and
1 46
from contributing to universal service funding.
These ventures qualified for such exemptions on
grounds that they did not offer telephone service
even though their offerings might require access
47
to the PSTN.1
When ISPs offer consumers telephone service
The difference between dominant and non-dominant
carrier regulation is striking, particularly in the area of
economic regulation. Dominant carriers are subject to
price cap or rate-of-return regulation at the federal level.
To change rates, a dominant carrier must file its tariff
and may wait up to several weeks before the new prices
go into effect. With few exceptions, non-dominant carrier prices are not regulated, and where tariffs are still
required changes can be made effective the day after the
amendment is filed. The FCC rarely decides to review
closely or declare unlawful a provision in a non-dominant carrier tariff; one FCC Commissioner recently
noted that it has happened only twice in the many years
(more than a decade) since the FCC adopted the dominant/non-dominant classification system.
Id.
145
SeeJames B. Speta, Handicappingthe Race for The Last
Mile?: A Critiqueof Open Access Rules for BroadbandPlatforms, 17
YALE J. ON REG. 39, 66 (2000).

TELECOMM. PoL'V
1413 Currently

The rules that emerged from the Computer Inquiry proceedings drew a distinction between 'basic' and 'enhanced' telecommunications services. Basic services
were those that involved only the transmission of sound
or data unchanged from beginning to end. Enhanced
services were all other services that 'acted on the format,
content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provided the subscriber with additional, different, or restructured information; or involved subscriber interaction with stored
information.' Basic transmission services were subject to
the 1934 Act's common carrierregulations; enhanced services were exempt from regulation under the 1934 Act.
Id. (emphasis added).

144 SeeJames H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriersand
the Decision Whether to Be a Common Carrieror a Non-Regulated
Communications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. L. J. 91, 96 (2000).

395-97.

[It] will be

necessary to compensate for the advantages enjoyed by
the incumbent by way of a series of compensatory measures in favour of the newcomers.
Antonio Perrucci & Michela Cimatoribus, Competition Convergence and Asymmety

in Telecommunications Regulation, 21

493, 497 (1997).
many cable television operators have upgraded their networks to provide access to the Internet. Consimers typically do not perceive a significant difference between the types of Internet access provided by cable
television companies on a non-common carrier basis and that
provided by telephone companies still regulated as common
carriers.

146

147

See Frieden, Regulatory Models Diverge, supra note 6, at
See Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11,541, 11,545,
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equivalents, which link PSTN access with Internetmediated telephony, preexisting regulatory exemptions tilt the competitive playing field to the
ISPs' advantage. Should significant telephony traffic volumes migrate to routings exempt from universal service contribution requirement, the sum
of funds available to achieve the universal service
mission will decline. The potential for declining
universal service funds occurs just as many governments have articulated a broader and more ambitious universal service mission for all citizens to
have access to both basic telephone service and
advanced Internet services.
XII.

Regulatory Opportunism

Some providers of Internet-mediated services
enjoy the opportunity to provide competitive,
functional equivalents to regulated offerings without the same regulatory burdens. Absent adjustments in the legal and regulatory arena, these
ventures, typically market entrants, may achieve
commercial success without having developed a
faster, better, more efficient and more convenient
innovation. They may offer something technologically and operationally awkward, but nevertheless
cheaper, because regulatory classifications exempt the operator from having to pay regulatorimposed fees.
Legislative changes in telecommunications laws
occur most infrequently, and regulatory lag frequently creates a significant time period, in
which changed technological and marketplace
conditions increasingly contrast with the regulatory status quo. During such periods of delayed
adjustment, the regulatory process may favor one
competitor over others. This can most likely occur
when marketplace conditions trigger new competitive opportunities and when technological convergence eliminates barriers to market entry or
market segmentation.
XIII.

Conclusion

The FCC prudently refrains from extending
"legacy" regulation to new technologies and services that may resemble something offered by incumbents. Surely regulation can drag and thwart
marketplace development, and conversely regulaparas. 83, 90 (1998).
1481n a price squeeze situation, a vertically integrated

tory forbearance can incubate and nurture new
technologies and services. However, at some point
newcomers may so develop market share and service functionally equivalent to what incumbents
offer but without incurring anything like the regulatory burdens incumbents bear. At this point,
regulatory asymmetry provides for less marketplace incubation and more marketplace distortion.
The private carrier, enhanced service provider
and interstate service classification each provided
rational exemptions from more costly and intrusive regulatory classifications. But regulatory arbitrageurs came to understand that qualifying for
these classifications provided "back door" opportunities to acquire market share and profits. It appears that the FCC has emphasized the potential
for private carriers, CLEC affiliates of ISPs, callback operators and Internet telephony providers
to provide both service diversity and financial savings to consumers. Yet, the Commission does not
assess whether these operators might have generated more consumer welfare enhancements if
they had been forced to comply with legacy regulations and been motivated to join with incumbents to streamline or reduce them in view of increasingly robust competition.
Conferring too comfortable an unregulated
niche or financial windfall eliminates the incentive for ventures to innovate, become facilitiesbased operators and diversify. Unless and until an
arbitrage opportunity closes, resellers, call-back
operators and Internet telephony vendors can
possibly do better by conserving capital, not investing heavily in facilities and developing other
indicia of similarity with incumbents lest they lose
a regulation conferred competitive advantage.
At some point the FCC unwittingly tilts the
competitive playing field in favor of players clever
enough to craft a service definition that permits
aggressive competition with incumbent services,
but which qualifies them for a host of arbitrary
and anomalous loopholes that exempt or reduce
the cost and inconvenience in regulatory compliance. Incumbents may suffer simply because of
the legacy regulations that continue to apply
rather than because they have greater market
share, the ability to exploit a bottleneck or handi148
cap market entrants with price squeezes.

firm with market power over an essential upstream inptut
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raises the price of this input to rivals competing in downstream retail markets. The increased cost of this essential
input forces downstream rivals to raise their retail prices.
The vertically integrated firm is then in a position to undercut the downstream rivals in retail markets and
thereby increase market share and profits.
Michael Kende, FCC OPP Working Paper 32, The Digital
Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 23, at http://
www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (2000). See also, United
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States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437-38 (2d Cir.
1945) (articulating a four-part test for price squeeze: (1) a
firm has monopoly power with respect to one product; (2) its
price for that product is higher than a "fair price;" (3) that
product is required to compete in a second market where the
monopolist itself competes; and (4) the monopolist's price in
the second market is so low that competitor's cannot match it
and still earn a "living profit").

